Seven months before Ole Gunnar Solskjaer was hired as Manchester United manager, the club had finished second in the league.

A year earlier, they’d finished sixth, but had won the League Cup and the Europa League, as Jose Mourinho gambled against qualification for the Champions League via finishing in the top four places.

These are the black and white achievements that begin any conversation about Manchester United’s modern successes and failures. As always – especially with United – it’s the shades of grey which are often forgotten, and generally forgotten completely over time as a new issue comes to light.

If we take the moment in time of Sir Alex’s retirement as our starting point, there are so many individual events that seemed to take United on the wrong track. Yes, this is written with the benefit of hindsight, but many issues were called at the time.

The first was whether David Moyes was best in class. His optimum time to leave Everton was arguably a year or two earlier than he did, and probably for a job like Arsenal – a big club that he deserved a go at, but one where not every word in press conferences would be analysed.

But it was not just Moyes who made mistakes. The club took Ferguson’s retirement to embrace social media fully, leading to the en masse arrival of the squad on Twitter, Instagram and Facebook, able to read the wonderful enlightened feedback of the British public after a result that was not positive. As we know, that’s been a tremendous assistance to the players, and also a source of great comfort to the fans who love reading ‘we go again’ posts.

Moyes’ mistakes were multiple and unfortunate. Backed by a novice in the job, it was deemed acceptable to wait until Maruoane Fellaini’s clause expired which would have allowed him to move to United for £5m cheaper, though at £23m, it would still have been expensive for a squad option. Fellaini was the first arrival, not Fabregas, not Thiago, into a title-winning squad.

The off-field arrivals were part of a revolving door – Jimmy Lumsden and Steve Round were now in, seeking advice from the United senior players who were wondering why Mike Phelan and Rene Meulensteen had been allowed to go.

Results were poor. Teams came to Old Trafford and cantered to their first win in a generation. Moyes signed Juan Mata, a number 10, for a club record fee, and then gave the incumbent number 10 a record salary on a five year contract.

Moyes and his staff was sacked after chastening home defeats to Liverpool and Manchester City, and after a symbolic loss at Everton made Champions League football mathematically impossible.

Louis van Gaal was hired as his successor but wouldn’t take charge until July, as he was manager of Holland at the World Cup. This period of rudderlessness worked out fantastically for United – Vidic had already signed for Inter, and Evra and Ferdinand followed him out of the door, while Ryan Giggs retired. Even more experience was lost through the season and it was replaced almost exclusively by newcomers to the Premier League in the form of Blind, Rojo, Herrera, Di Maria and Falcao to name just five.

These new faces were complemented in the starting line up by rookies Tyler Blackett, Paddy McNair, Adnan Januzaj and Jesse Lingard. To add to the turbulence, Van Gaal tried a number of different systems, none of which were successful – and, in the crunch run of fixtures that earned United Champions League football, only Daley Blind from the new crop started.

Champions League football had been the aim despite the summer spend being so gargantuan. The loss of experience was too much to handle and now it was clear that the likes of Smalling, Jones, Carrick, Rooney, Young and Valencia would form critical roles in terms of their experience at the club, in spite of the fact that all should at this point have been serving as the stand ins for stronger options in a team that would have been genuinely challenging. But they had to be retained, as without them, the domestic and winning experience would be all but gone.

That was okay – top four qualification was crucial to United’s hopes, and Van Gaal’s short term contract had a plan that Ryan Giggs would succeed him from assistant. The second summer of spending was more understated. More good squad players allowed to go. Depay, Schweinsteiger, Schneiderlin, Darmian brought in. Romero, the Sampdoria reserve, on a free, as it was anticipated De Gea would leave for Real Madrid.

Early in the season Carrick and Rooney confronted Van Gaal over the training. United were not scoring and not entertaining their fans. Possession football was not being met with an end goal. This was a transitional season – a league title up for grabs and stolen (deservedly) by Leicester.

Mourinho, who had won the title the previous year at Chelsea, was sacked within months of that success after results and a legal dispute soured the relationship quickly. It was obvious Mourinho would be next at United.

Woodward, despite having the option in December, didn’t fire Van Gaal – United lost to Norwich and Stoke in embarrassing fashion and then exited the Champions League. Still no Jose – Van Gaal picked up momentum when injuries meant kids were brought into the side. Marcus Rashford breathed new life into the season – United won the FA Cup – Van Gaal was sacked as he collected the trophy, having failed to finish in the top four.

Out went his staff, including Giggs, because Mourinho was finally in town. He compensated for the lack of Champions League football by getting cosy with Mino Raiola to sign Ibrahimovic, Pogba, Mkhitaryan. Eric Bailly also signed.

His shape was a 4-2-3-1 (Pogba in the two) and he spoke of specialists for positions. And, for a while, it worked. Mkhitaryan was confusingly never played, while Bailly (et al) had a shocker in a 4-0 loss at Chelsea. A 2-1 defeat at home to City showed Guardiola already had a style his players were responding to. A 0-0 draw at Liverpool suggested the same for Mourinho – United fans, used to poor football under Van Gaal, would tolerate this if it had an end goal.

United went on a long unbeaten run from November to the end of January, but Mourinho refused to count that defeat at Hull in the League Cup semi second leg as he thought the refereeing was poor, so the run went all the way to March. In-between times, United won the League Cup with a poor display against Southampton, which Mourinho didn’t seem to want to celebrate.

His target was the top four but even the long unbeaten run hadn’t made that safe. In big games at Arsenal and Spurs, Mourinho rested players, aiding the comfortable defeats United suffered – United finished sixth, their lowest position since Moyes, but won the Europa League, the gamble paying off for the manager but coming at some cost.

With a return to Champions League football, Mourinho signed Matic and Lukaku – two footballers not suited for a pacy game – and Victor Lindelof. United equalled their best ever tally after eight matches of a Premier League season but by December’s 2-1 home defeat to Man City Mourinho said the title was ‘over’ as they fell an alarming eleven points behind.

The reaction was to sign Alexis Sanchez in a swap for Mkhitaryan; the Chilean had wanted away from Arsenal, and in lieu of a fee was paid astronomical wages which had a ripple impact on the rest of the squad.

Despite the options available to him, Mourinho persisted with Valencia and Young at full back and Smalling at centre back. Sanchez’s form was poor, with Rashford and Martial forced to watch from the bench despite having been in good form.

United exited the Champions League with an abysmal home defeat to Sevilla. Lukaku admitted some players were ‘hiding’, and Mourinho’s remarks were even more extraordinary.

“I sat in this chair twice in the Champions League after knocking out Manchester United at home, at Old Trafford,” he said. “In this chair with Porto [in 2004] and Real Madrid [in 2013], they are out both times. It is not something new for the club.”

Mourinho had just been given a new three year contract, even though the title would have been wrapped up with seven games left if they had succumbed to the 2-0 scoreline they trailed by at half-time to City. United came back to win – but then lost at home to a dreadful West Brom team the following week to hand them the title. They then whimpered out the end of the season, losing a poor Cup Final against Chelsea. The back five were De Gea, Valencia, Smalling, Jones, and Young.

United needed serious additions to challenge for the title as it appeared they were weak in almost every area. Mourinho and Ed Woodward did not appear to see eye to eye on the transfers – but money was spent on Dalot and Fred.

No money was spent on a new centre half, with Lindelof and Bailly’s omission from the last final seen as a damning indictment of Mourinho’s judgement, in spite of the club desperately needing reinforcement.

That came even before the acknowledgement that Pogba had been hit and miss, the forward line of Sanchez and Lukaku couldn’t deliver a league title, the full-backs were veterans and needed to be replaced, Martial had never reached his potential, and even Matic, whilst good, would need to be replaced by a vibrant youngster to keep up with the styles of the strong teams in the league.

United fans were growing wearily familiar of the pattern – the club were doing enough to get into the top four and bring in the additional revenue and advertising, but the owners would always prefer to pocket dividends and personal windfalls instead of allowing that money to be invested in players it needed to bridge the gap.

City, and Chelsea, and other continental clubs, were reinforcing from positions of strength, emboldening that power of internal competition, whereas United were always signing a player desperately needed more than a season too late.

Worse still, Liverpool were showing how to progress as a club with its own resources and a clever plan. United had neither, with their own money being drained out of the club and a long contract given to a man they clearly had no intention of backing.

Mourinho needed to evolve, too. His pragmatic tactics had worked at clubs where he had greater resources so he could stifle the competition, but now new ideas were needed.

His aide Rui Faria left – and Michael Carrick and Kieran McKenna were hired. There were constant rumours of a director of football – it never came. Nor did a serious commitment to the club’s ideology at youth level – Mourinho was committed to short term success on the field, though it has to be said to his credit he never allowed the long standing record of a club developed player being in the team to fall away.

United entered the new season with all of this discontent and Mourinho began to change shapes and move players into unfamiliar positions, often coming at heavy cost in terms of results. Throughout most of it, Fellaini’s presence was almost totemic, coming often as a plan B or increasingly as a plan A with no plan B.

This did not go down tremendously well with the players. Mourinho and Pogba infamously clashed at Southampton (where the manager had played Matic and McTominay in defence in a dreadful 2-2 draw) where Jose described Pogba as ‘a virus’ in front of his team-mates. His position was untenable after soulless defeats to Brighton, Spurs, West Ham and Man City before December. This was official after a similarly awful loss at Anfield.

It was a surprising decision for the board to take mid-season as there was not an obvious successor for Mourinho available in football, a sign of how bad things had become in terms of internal politics and how low the mood was.

Three managers of different styles and approaches had all been tried and failed. The latter two could point to trophies but the club were a significant way away from being one of the better teams in the league.

The poor football and timid approach in big games would have been accepted if the results and trophies came, but with neither, there was little to justify persevering with such a toxic environment.

With a name needed quickly to take charge of the club’s next league future, familiar faces Ole Gunnar Solskjaer and Mick Phelan were brought back on a temporary basis.

Solskjaer’s first team at Cardiff was : De Gea, Young, Jones, Lindelof, Shaw, Herrera, Matic, Pogba, Lingard, Rashford, Martial. Most reasonable observers would conclude that team was nine or ten players off being a title winning or even title challenging team.

Of course, the problems extended far beyond the players.

There was an attitude at the club which had been present since the Moyes days and now almost encouraged by Mourinho in his first season – some results mattered, others didn’t. United couldn’t afford off days, but they now had many. It meant that against opponents who always raised their game, United rarely matched their commitment or energy, and the confidence issue that came with being unable to beat a Brighton manifested itself in an inferiority complex against the likes of Liverpool and City.

In Sanchez, United had a huge problem – players signing new contracts now had cause to demand unreasonably high salaries. They would have to find someone to take him for nothing; his performances were not justifying his place at the club.

The owners, meanwhile, had no long term plan in place – they’d literally just dismissed an experienced manager, and brought in someone whose experience was around the club as a player and reserve team coach.

But that first game was won 5-1 – the first five in the league since Ferguson’s last game – and the next seven were also won, including games at Spurs and Arsenal, where Solskjaer used different tactical systems to achieve good performances and results.

After a dramatic Champions League win in Paris, Solskjaer was given the job on a permanent basis, but the season ended miserably as reality hit home and the size of the job at hand became evident.

After a 4-0 defeat at Everton, Solskjaer had some hard words. “We just didn’t perform. That was not worthy of a Manchester United team. That performance is not good enough for a Manchester United team, from me to players, we let the fans down, we let the club down. That performance is difficult to describe because it is so bad. They beat us on all the basics. We were beaten on all the ingredients you need, added to the talent. There is no place you can hide on the pitch… You have got to ask them (if they cared). I have asked them. Of course if you want to play at this club, it has to be more. I want my team to be the hardest working team in the league, that is what we were under Sir Alex [Ferguson] – [Ryan] Giggs, Becks [David Beckham], Gary Neville, Denis [Irwin] – no matter how much talent you have got, you run more than anyone. You can’t change your whole squad. One step at a time. I am going to be successful here and there are players who won’t be part of that.”

Some statements were made that summer. Herrera left on a free as United refused to give into his wage demands, following Fellaini out the door. Sanchez was given to Inter, Lukaku followed him after a stroppy summer, Young followed them after a professional conclusion to his career at the club, Smalling went to Italy too, and Valencia was allowed to go home.

Solskjaer was given two first team players, Wan-Bissaka and Maguire, and Dan James as a squad option. A poor run of results that included defeat to West Ham and Newcastle had some speculating that the job was too big for Solskjaer – but he recovered with 11 wins from 17 games to get into the new year, where he was given Bruno Fernandes, a star to bring the creativity that Paul Pogba was failing to.

But even that signing came on the back of a season threatening to fall away – defeat to City in the League Cup semi final was followed by a loss at Anfield and an embarrassing home defeat to Burnley.

The pandemic hit, and United’s return on ‘Project Restart’ saw them take to training ground environments perfectly – they played their best football in years, scoring plenty of goals. But Solskjaer, feeling the pressure that he should rotate his players, began to do so in games where it counted against him – exposing the lack of squad depth, and costing the FA Cup semi final against Chelsea.

In their third semi final of the season, United then lost to Sevilla in the Europa League, but finished third in the league – this was an undeniable step forward for United, who now had to do what they hadn’t done with Van Gaal and Mourinho, and push on from a position of strength.

Solskjaer, for his part, would have to prove himself capable of making the step up. He had grown reliant on the 4-2-3-1 with Fernandes as a ten. United started the season horrendously, losing 3-1 to Palace and then 6-1 at home to Spurs. Solskjaer was spared further scrutiny by a spate of freak results around the league, which included new champions Liverpool losing 7-2 to Aston Villa on the same weekend.

The pandemic had been blamed for United’s reticent spending (just £40m on Van De Beek) but all talk of that, stability and forward planning was rendered ridiculous when Cavani – available all summer – came on a free, Amad Diallo was signed for a fee of up to £40 million, Facundo Pellestri came in at around a quarter of that fee, and Alex Telles came in for £15m with Luke Shaw’s career presumably over after the horror show against Spurs.

United, then, had spent around £90m that barely went used over the coming months. Solskjaer, having looked on the brink, managed to get strong consistency from his team, in spite of worrying lows, like the home defeat to Arsenal where Roy Keane insisted the players would get him sacked.

After four years of the club not having a defined eleven or shape they now had both and it was helping – United finished second in the league, and lost in the League Cup semi final again, but this time qualified for the Europa League final.

The selection for the final revealed much – Solskjaer couldn’t do anything about the injury of Maguire, but had to play Lindelof and Bailly, which hadn’t worked since they’d been signed (to the extent that Mourinho hadn’t trusted them for his own final in 2019). The penny had dropped with Martial, who was out of the the team for the veteran Cavani. The functional axis of McTominay and Fred was tinkered with on the big occasion, the temptation to play Pogba too strong (although Fred was carrying a knock, too). Changes didn’t come in the final until it was too late to matter.

United drew against Villarreal and lost on penalties – David De Gea failing to save a single one and then missing his vital kick.

Was his career over at the club? Was Ole’s? Neither – both started the following campaign. Second was a strong base for Ole to build on, and De Gea was given a reprieve as Dean Henderson had Covid. This transfer window was more structured – Varane in. Sancho in. Targets to (ostensibly) immediately improve the side.

But United needed more if they wanted to challenge for the league (after all, other rivals were strengthening, too) – most significantly, one or two midfielders, and less so, a striker. The opportunity to sign Ronaldo came along – the Glazers took it.

The move raised the value of the club, the owners cashed in shares worth well over £100m and took that money away from the club, just months after promising to engage more truthfully and transparently with supporters after protests. That money will not be seen in Manchester again, not at Old Trafford in terms of a new lick of paint on the stand nor in the form of a midfielder in the middle of the pitch. At the critical moment where United looked like competing, the owners saw the money on the table and took it for themselves.

United have a strong enough squad to challenge as they have been but not to challenge for first and this is where the season has unravelled. With that weight of expectation now on performances, too, United have been expected to elevate themselves to be at a level they didn’t expect to find themselves at, which is ironic considering the club they are at. Varane and Sancho have missed most of the games through injury or selection – so Ronaldo aside, it’s been the same squad, flattering to deceive, faltering under the weight of expectation of a home crowd that demands they not only win against Aston Villa but put on a show.

Against Villa, Solskjaer started with five of his own men, six if you include (as you should) Greenwood who he gave a debut to. At least three of the other five (and two who came on after injuries) will not feature in United teams that win league titles.

It’s rebuilding at normal pace in football, but normal pace is not acceptable at the financial rate Manchester City, Chelsea and now Newcastle can turnover players. Liverpool’s progress under Klopp has been cited – by this writer too – but it’s clear United are not at the same level as the Anfield lot were after three years with their boss.

The manager is responsible for the composition of his squad three years in but it goes to show just how significant and deep the rot was that in case of an injury or two then Bailly and Lindelof will still be straight in the team, or five years on we’re still trying to find out what Pogba’s best position is, or we’re just ever one or two poor results away from a complete drop of confidence in a squad that just looks like it’s waiting for the next manager.

Solskjaer, having trusted one system for so long, now gambled on another, and it didn’t work when it mattered, so now looks like what it was – a pragmatic gamble that failed.

There’s no accountability, no player taking responsibility other than a 36 year old man with nothing to prove and yet the ambition to do so because of personal standards – the hope that this would rub off on a squad needing some of that drive has not been immediately forthcoming. Roy Keane called them bluffers. He could have been speaking for the men on the pitch or the men in the boardroom.

For all their promises, it’s the same old story with the Glazer family.

“Better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak and to remove all doubt,” Lincoln once said, and you can replace the word fool for liar and place that in this context for how most United fans will see their previously mute owners.

Solskjaer is a convenient man for them – the squad and the owners – to have as manager, as it appeared from the start, because there will remain a section of the support who are disgusted he has been put in this position – to have not been backed properly in the last 15 months and to now have it look like it’s solely his inexperience at this level which is holding the club back.

It’s difficult to pause in times of trouble and be objective in assessment – that he’s still exceeding what was expected of him when he got the job, but that those initial reservations that he didn’t have the experience or ability to take on this job full-time are sadly well-founded. He has navigated difficult moments and found solutions but when the bumps do come, they come in a more alarming manner than the earlier ones, increasing that fear that problems are worsening.

This undermines all of the fantastic work he’s done in stabilising the club, because it places him in a position where he is being personally vilified in a manner that managers with greater experience were not; it’s a headscratcher of an ironic riddle, but it is unfortunately the case, and it pits two sets of fans against each other, and a third set here for the poison who were just desperate for him to fail as they were Jose Mourinho fans and not United fans (the same group who would have been telling you that Conte would win the Champions League with this squad).

United now have a first choice team and a first choice shape – something they haven’t had since 2013 – and despite the stability that comes with it, of course there is the criticism that it’s too rigid, too predictable and Ole has his favourites to a fault. This should be the bare minimum at a club, and it is, but is shows how poor things were.

We just wanted to enjoy watching football again – and we were, but now we are not, and just like under Van Gaal and Mourinho, when we are not enjoying watching football, and there is little else to invest hope in with the idea of things changing, you feel change is inevitable.

All of which is fair criticism, but balanced against the manic alternative, this is still probably the healthiest situation the footballing side of the club has been in as a whole since Ferguson retired, if you were to look at the bequeathment for any potential successor.

But on that point, it’s also a fair moment in time to take stock of what is available and ask the questions : would Manchester United be doing better with a more experienced coach? Shouldn’t United be using this moment of relative health (all things considered – I urge you to look at the bigger picture) and bringing in a manager to move forward instead of having to do a deep fix, which may well end up being the solution if this drags on longer than necessary?

What’s the alternative – has Solskjaer been promised £100m to sign a midfielder or two, Trippier and another back up defender in January? The ambitions for this season are already having to be hastily revised and we’re only in November.

An FA Cup and a push at the Champions League, inspired by nothing other than the image of Ronaldo relentlessly refusing to give in? That’s United’s reality for this season now, change or not.

The financial backing isn’t going to happen. If it did, is there a guarantee a player would play? Sancho hasn’t, despite it being obvious that he should play on the right, and he was coveted for 18 months – so is it necessarily to be taken as read that a Neves would displace Fred?

So the alternative is to bring in a coach to try and bring an improvement which we know the squad is capable of. Are they better than the second place of last season? I’m going to be honest – I don’t think so, not under the backing of any coach in the world. I don’t think Klopp gets this team above City or his own Liverpool.

That’s why I’ve been willing to give Solskjaer the benefit of the doubt. It doesn’t mean that a better coach can’t come in and get results. But if they can’t get better than second, then I would be reluctant to make a change and throw away what’s been built. That’s been the sticking point for most – because United could easily make a change for the sake of it, and bring in someone just to finish second or third, and that manager would have the same arguments thrown at him dressed up in different ways.

My own gut feeling was that he would be defined by the performances of those survivors from previous regimes that he continued to show faith in. I feel that’s been somewhat proven in the form of Lindelof, Bailly, Pogba and Fred, but we’re now at a point in the cycle where it looks like Maguire and Wan-Bissaka may well need replacing and as we’ve seen in the past, in that circumstance, the owners have held the manager accountable and not allowed him to make that change himself. That has only served to undermine the position of whoever Manchester United manager is.

I admire those of you reading this who have navigated through these difficult few weeks and months and still resolved that the best answer was to support as best you can. It’s easy to be critical, easier to be negative, and clearly to some it’s enjoyable to revel in toxicity and abuse because you can just abandon reason and objectivity.

It’s easy to look at the mess Mourinho left and simply ask if any trophies have been delivered in the meantime – it doesn’t require critical thinking or a real understanding of football, just as it didn’t when people were just putting the mess in December 2018 only at Mourinho’s feet. It was easy to say Mourinho burned it down because that’s what he does, just as it is easy to say United are underachieving because Ole is inexperienced at this level.

Three years ago I was saying it was unreasonable to expect Mourinho to deliver Guardiola results when he didn’t have the budget and didn’t have the same capability to turn over players who were failures. I said it wasn’t fair to back him in some instances and not others. I questioned the wisdom of giving him a long-term contract only to not support him in the way that contract implied you would. “He’s had money! He’s had time!” These were the replies. They were fair, but didn’t take in the full context.

Eventually that context narrows and the question simplifies : is he doing the best with what he has? Is this working out?

The same principle applies here.

However, we are now here, in that situation football provides, a rut of poor results and performances as significant as any in the post-Ferguson era.

But we’ve been here before – United didn’t hire the best in class in 2013. They didn’t in 2014. They didn’t bring in Mourinho in December 2015 when the league was wide open. They waited, and waited, until a reset was necessary, each progressively worse than the last.

It’s a testament to the work Solskjaer has done that this is the best – but it still doesn’t mean that a reset isn’t necessary, or that he isn’t contributing to the issues by consistently picking teams that just don’t work.

He has taken the club and team as far as he could and that is commendable considering the failures of his predecessors and it’s a testament to Solskjaer’s character that he probably won’t walk because he is not a quitter.

The trolls will want you to believe he’s overseen the worst period in the club’s history but even Helen Lovejoy would be embarrassed by that hysterical over-reaction.

Optimists will point to the lows of December 1989 and recall how 18 months later United defeated Barcelona in the Cup Winners Cup with some of the squad believing they were the best team in Europe. They’ll use that as evidence of very low points being followed by the highest of points as a result of faith and stability.

And Solskjaer has definitely provided the latter quality more than any other manager – there is more of a feeling of United being like the club it was prior to 2014. Is that important? The critics will say no. That’s an outdated concept. The issue is the examples they use – City and Chelsea are models built on regeneration, which they can do because they have almost endless benevolence getting them out of danger (and even that, as we’ve seen at Chelsea, can sometimes not be quite as infinite as it seems).

United are an individual case. They will need stability to build upon, like Liverpool. But they’re a unique club in more than just that regard.

Every Tom, Dick and Burnley comes to Old Trafford and raises their game – that’s a part of the prestige of playing for the club. You get a social media following that multiplies exponentially, a platform on which to post your highlight reels or sadly inform supporters you’ll go again. Engagement is good either way. It’s there to soothe the ego and today even the unpopular players can post a ‘we go again’ and choose to look at the sympathy instead of the vitriol, for it will be there.

Do enough of them care enough to show an upturn in form or commitment? A physical reaction? Ferguson would have banned them all from social media. He would have probably instructed them to delete their accounts.

What’s the cost of failure? There isn’t one. There has to be. And it can’t always be with the manager, even if in this case it probably will be. When you lose like United have, the consequences have to be significant. There has to be change.

Solskjaer demanded a reaction at Watford – if he’s there to get it. The issue is United could turn it on. They could also get battered by a Watford team who still see United as a scalp and that’s, again, part of the privilege of playing for the club. How many players are willing to show they’ve earned their place here? Arriving isn’t earning. Achieving is. Two players have earned that right – the two best players this season.

You have to have a manager in charge who understands that unique pressure too and in Solskjaer they have a manager who does more than any other of Ferguson’s predecessors – he just doesn’t have the experience of winning as a manager elsewhere to complement it, which is a significant issue. He knows it, and embodied it as a player, but getting that message across as a manager is a very different thing. We are witnessing that now and we have witnessed it before. Even Mourinho, a manager with a personal need to win, could not quite get to grips with the idea that opponents treated United like a cup final and so he had to rouse his own players appropriately.

Does a Ferguson-style manager exist, one whose relentless desire to win at everything marries perfectly with United, rather than attempting to engineer it through Solskjaer? This is not the same as a motivator, in whatever guise they come – be it a Conte, a Ten Haag or a Rodgers – because it needs to be a man who can not only motivate the players, but create a standard that demands they give their most, which is something required by Manchester United players every time they step on the pitch.

United’s players not only have to have the skill to win and entertain. They have to earn the right to win, and too often this season they have not shown that level of commitment, so they have often either not won or lost and lost heavily and embarrassingly. The occasion of playing for Manchester United in any game should bring it out of you.

If it does not, then the occasion of playing against Liverpool or City should. And if that does not even get a personal reaction, well…

The pair of performances we just saw were just as meek, if not moreso, than the pair under Moyes, and regardless of whatever merit there is in the positive work done by the manager, it suggests that there is something irreparable.

You can’t replace a full squad – and you wouldn’t want to this time, because United have, to labour the point once more, a fairly good position.

There is that predictable silence (other than the annoying social media apologies) that comes as the club take stock before the rumours will probably start tonight or tomorrow – maybe Romano will prepare another video telling us the decision was made in the last few hours, who knows?

Perhaps the best thing to emphasise the progress of the club and the standards Ole had tried to reintroduce (the standards he spoke of after the results) is to make the decision as swiftly and academically as possible, because everyone associated with the club knows the nature of the last two defeats is simply unacceptable and requires immediate attention.